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I. INTRODUCTION  
In a public merger, there is a delay between the signing of the 
merger agreement and the closing where the purchase price is paid to the 
target. 2  Reasons for the delay include obtaining needed shareholder 
approval under state law and complying with federal securities and 
antitrust law.3  This delay creates what some commentators have called 
“deal risk,” or the risk that adverse changes to a party between signing 
and closing will make the deal unprofitable for the counterparty.4  In 
cash deals, deal risk usually applies to the target because the target does 
not care about the state of the acquiror’s business so long as it has the 
cash to pay the purchase price. In stock deals, stock-and-cash deals, and 
deals involving debt as consideration, however, deal risk applies to both 
the target and the acquiror because the target receives a debt or equity 
interest in the surviving entity and, therefore, cares about the condition 
of the acquiror’s business.  Of course, the acquiror cares about the value 
of the business it is purchasing regardless of the form of consideration. 
To allocate deal risk in a public merger, parties often include a 
Material Adverse Change (“MAC”) provision in the merger agreement.5  
1 J.D. Candidate, 2017 at the University of Tennessee College of Law.  The author 
would like to thank Joan M. Heminway, Rick Rose Distinguished Professor of Law, for 
her thoughtful comments on earlier drafts of this article.  The author also would like to 
thank the editorial staff of Transactions: Tennessee Journal of Business Law for their patience 
and help throughout the editing process.   
2 JAMES C. FREUND, ANATOMY OF A MERGER: STRATEGIES AND TECHNIQUES FOR 
NEGOTIATING CORPORATE ACQUISITIONS 148-149 (1975).   
3 Id.; Robert Miller, Canceling the Deal: Two Models of Material Adverse Change Clauses in 
Business Combination Agreements, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 99, 107 (2009).   
4 Miller, supra note 3, at 108.   
5 Nathan Somogie, Note, Failure of a “Basic Assumption”: The Emerging Standard for Excuse 
under MAE Provisions, 108 MICH. L. REV. 81, 86 (2009).  Although Material Adverse 
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Legal drafters commonly include a MAC provision in a merger 
agreement in two principal ways:  (1) as a closing condition that entitles 
an acquiror not to close if the target suffers a MAC between a specified 
date (e.g., the date of the target’s last audited balance sheet before 
signing) and the closing date;6 or (2) as a target representation that the 
business has not suffered a MAC between signing and closing, 
accompanied by a closing condition that allows the acquiror to excuse 
performance if the representation is false.7  How and when a party may 
invoke a MAC provision depends upon the definition of a MAC in the 
merger agreement.  Thus, the MAC definition often is highly negotiated 
because the declaration of a MAC may result in the acquiror terminating 
the merger or, more often, extending negotiations to seek a lower 
purchase price. 
This article presents a draft definition 8  of “Material Adverse 
Change” for inclusion in a hypothetical merger of XYZ Oil Distributing 
Company, Inc. (“Target Co.”) with and into ABC Energy Company, Inc. 
(“Acquiring Co.”).  Delaware law governs the merger agreement.  The 
parties plan to include the MAC term in the merger agreement as a 
closing condition that entitles Acquiring Co. not to close if Target Co. 
suffers a material adverse change between signing and closing.  The 
article discusses the transactional context of the merger of Target Co. 
with and into Acquiring Co., including the factual background along with 
the drafting norms and legal principles governing MAC definitions.  
Then, the article describes the major issues involved in drafting a MAC 
definition and provides an analysis of how to resolve these issues.  The 
article concludes with a list of minor issues and drafting choices that may 
require a drafter’s further attention.  
Change and Material Adverse Effect provisions are slightly different, they perform the 
same function in merger agreements.  Robert T. Miller, supra note 3, at 99 n.1; see also 
Kenneth A. Adams, A Legal-Usage Analysis of “Material Adverse Change” Provisions, 10 
FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 9, 18–19 (2004) (noting that “Material Adverse Change” 
works best for absolute representations).  This article refers to both as MAC provisions.   
6  Andrew A. Schwartz, A “Standard Clause Analysis” of the Frustration Doctrine and the 
Material Adverse Change Clause, 57 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 789, 819–20 (2010).    
7 Stephen M. Kotran et al., Practice Note, Material Adverse Change Provisions: Mergers and 
Acquisitions, WEST: PRACTICAL LAW, https://next.westlaw.com (search in search bar for 
“Kotran, Material Adverse Change”; then follow the first hyperlink) (maintained).      
8 The draft provision is attached as Exhibit A to this article.   
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II. TRANSACTIONAL CONTEXT  
A.  Factual Background 
Acquiring Co. is a Delaware corporation that drills and maintains 
oil wells throughout the Southwestern United States.  Acquiring Co. has 
publicly traded common stock with a value of $500 million.  Acquiring 
Co. has $900 million worth of secured and unsecured debt.  Acquiring 
Co. had annual earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and 
amortization (“EBITDA”) of approximately one billion dollars between 
2009 and 2012 and of $900 million between 2012 and 2015.  Acquiring 
Co. plans to combine its business with Target Co.’s through a merger of 
Target Co. with and into Acquiring Co.  Acquiring Co. will pay cash as 
the consideration in the transaction.   
Target Co. is a Delaware corporation that distributes crude oil 
throughout the world. Target Co. has publicly traded common stock 
with a value of $250 million.  In addition, Target Co. has $600 million 
worth of unsecured and secured debt.  Target Co. had EBITDA 
approximating $600 million from 2009 to 2012.  But Target Co.’s 
EBITDA dropped to $400 million from 2012 to 2015. Target Co. also 
has three subsidiaries, which are all incorporated in Delaware.  The 
subsidiaries’ corporate names are Volunteer Resources, Inc., Capital 
Shipping, Inc., and Huxley Distribution, Inc.  Although the relative 
percentages fluctuate slightly, Target Co.’s subsidiaries, as a whole, 
normally account for 60% of Target Co.’s revenues and each subsidiary 
is close in size such that each one normally accounts for 20% of Target 
Co.’s overall revenue.   
Beginning in 2012, Target Co. experienced operational and 
managerial failures that decreased the company’s earnings. In 2012, 
Target Co. decided to expand its business into new markets.  To this 
end, Target Co. purchased Volunteer Resources, Inc. (“Volunteer”), 
which is engaged in the business of mining.  Volunteer performed 
slightly better than Target Co.’s other subsidiaries from 2012 to 2014.  In 
fact, Volunteer accounted for 25% of Target Co.’s revenue over that 
period.  In 2015, however, several plaintiffs brought state and federal 
claims against Volunteer and Target Co., alleging that Volunteer 
intentionally polluted a local river.  The complaint asks for damages in 
excess of fifty million dollars, and Volunteer’s litigation lawyers estimate 
1010         TRANSACTIONS: THE TENNESSEE JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW          [Vol. 18 
that the whole case could cost two million dollars in legal fees and 
expenses.   
In 2013, Target Co. entered into a credit facility with Finance Co 
under which Finance Co. agreed to advance a maximum amount of $250 
million over a six-year period.  In the credit agreement, Target Co. 
promised that it would not allow its earnings to fall below 85% of its 
earnings in 2011. In 2014, Target Co. experienced a 20% drop in 
earnings after the price of crude oil collapsed, which triggered a covenant 
default under its loan documents with Finance Co.  As a result, Target 
Co. was forced to restructure its credit facility and to enter into a 
forbearance agreement with Finance Co.  Additionally, financial analysts 
have predicted that Target Co. will not meet external projections of its 
earnings in the first and second fiscal quarters of 2017.   
In October 2016, Acquiring Co. and Target Co. signed a merger 
agreement and that agreement contemplates a one-year delay between 
signing and closing. Acquiring Co. insisted on including a MAC qualifier 
in the conditions to closing to ensure that it is protected if Target Co. 
suffers an adverse change during the delay.  The MAC provision will 
allow Acquiring Co. to terminate the merger agreement and walk away 
from the transaction if Target Co. suffers a material adverse change 
during the delay period.  Further, Acquiring Co. may use the MAC 
provision as leverage to renegotiate for a lower purchase price if Target 
Co. suffers an adverse change, but Acquiring Co. still desires to close the 
transaction.  
B.  Drafting Norms 
A MAC provision is typically divided into two parts: the main 
definition and the exceptions. 9  The main definition describes, often 
generically, what constitutes a material adverse change. 10  The exceptions 
more pointedly designate events that would otherwise constitute a MAC 
9 See, e.g., Basic Energy Services, Inc., Agreement and Plan of Merger (Ex. 2.1, Form 8-
K) (Apr. 20, 2008).   
10 See Frontier Oil v. Holly Corp., No. Civ.A. 20502, 2005 WL 1039027, at *33 (Del. 
Ch. Apr. 29, 2005) (“It would be neither original nor perceptive to observe that 
defining a ‘Material Adverse Effect’ as a ‘materially adverse effect’ is not especially 
helpful.”).     
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but that the parties have agreed to exclude from the definition. Next, the 
article describes the drafting norms for each of these parts in turn.   
Professor Robert T. Miller has suggested dividing the main 
definition into the “Expectation Metric” and the “MAC Objects.”11  This 
structure accurately reflects the organization of the main definition based 
on my survey of precedent documents in the oil and gas industry.12  The 
Expectation Metric describes the proximity of the connection between a 
given set of facts and an alleged MAC on the target.13  By contrast, the 
MAC Objects specify the items that a given set of facts must adversely 
affect to constitute a MAC.14   
The five most common Expectation Metrics, listed according to 
scope from broadest to narrowest, are: (1) facts that could reasonably be 
expected to constitute a MAC; (2) facts that are reasonably likely to 
constitute a MAC; (3) facts that would be reasonably expected to cause a 
MAC; and (4) facts that actually cause a MAC.15  The difference between 
these articulations may appear unimportant, but the choice of an 
Expectation Metric is significant to drafters and to the parties and their 
legal counsel, in general.16  For example, the difference between “could 
reasonably be expected to constitute a MAC” and “actually causes a 
MAC” is stark. 17  To illustrate this point, imagine a target’s earnings 
dropped by 20% between signing and closing.  Under the former 
standard, the acquiror would only have to show that the decline in 
earnings has a rational possibility of materially and adversely affecting the 
target.  This task is less arduous than showing that the earnings decline 
actually caused a material adverse change.   
11 Miller, supra note 3, at 112.   
12 See, e.g., Energy XXI (Bermuda), Ltd, Agreement and Plan of Merger (Ex. 2.1, Form 
8-K) (Mar. 13, 2014); Pioneer Natural Resources Co., Agreement and Plan of Merger 
(Ex. 2.1, Form 8-K) (Aug. 21, 2013); Union Drilling Inc., (Ex. 2.1, Form 8-K) (Sept. 28, 
2012).   
13 Miller, supra note 3, at 112.   
14 Id. at 115.   
15 Id. at 114.   
16 Id. at 112.   
17 Id. at 112–13.   
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Moreover, the MAC Objects cover the separate components of a 
target’s business.  In a cash merger, the most common MAC Objects are 
the target’s business, financial condition, results of operations, and 
assets. 18  The MAC Objects also may cover specific situations relevant to 
a transaction.  For example, if a particular customer is essential to a 
target’s business, the MAC Objects may specifically include the loss of 
that customer. Some merger agreements also include, together with the 
MAC Objects, events or circumstances that “materially impair or limit” 
the target’s ability to perform or enter into the agreement.19   
At this point, an example of a main definition is useful to 
illustrate the use of an Expectation Metric and MAC Objects.  The 
example below was included in a stock merger in the oil and gas 
industry.  Both the Expectation Metric and the MAC Objects are 
underlined.  Notably, the definition also includes events that materially 
limit the target’s ability to consummate the merger or perform under the 
merger agreement.   
 “Material Adverse Effect” with respect to [the Target] 
means any fact, circumstance, event, change, effect or 
occurrence that, individually or in the aggregate, with all 
other facts, circumstances, events, changes, effects or 
occurrences, has had or would be reasonably likely to 
have a material adverse effect on the assets, properties, 
business, results of operation or condition (financial or 
otherwise) of [the Target] and its Subsidiaries, taken as a 
whole, or that would be reasonably likely to prevent or 
materially delay or materially impair the ability of [the 
Target] to perform its obligations hereunder or to 
consummate the Merger or the other transactions 
contemplated hereby.20 
18 Miller, supra note 3, at 116.   
19 E.g., Transocean, Ltd., Agreement and Plan of Merger (Ex. 2.1, Form 8-K) (Aug. 1, 
2016); see also Bloomberg Law, IN PRACTICE: M&A, DRAFTING GUIDE: ACQUISITION 
AGREEMENT – QUALIFIERS IN ACQUISITION AGREEMENTS, https://www. 
bloomberglaw.com/product/corptrans/document/X14AU6D8000000.  
20 Transocean, Ltd., Agreement and Plan of Merger (Ex. 2.1, Form 8-K) (Aug. 1, 2016).   
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Finally, exceptions can vary widely from transaction to 
transaction, but parties usually agree to exclude what commentators call 
“systematic risk,” “indicator risk,” and “agreement risk.”21  Systematic 
risk includes macroeconomic shifts, industry changes, or changes in the 
law.22  For example, MAC definitions in the oil industry typically exclude 
fluctuations in the price of hydrocarbons. 23  Systematic risk is the most 
popular among the quintessential exceptions.24  By contrast, agreement 
risk includes events arising out of the announcement of the merger.25  
Examples of agreement risk are the loss of major customers or key 
employees who prefer only to do business with or work for the target.26  
Agreement risk is slightly less common than systematic risk but more 
popular with drafters than indicator risk. 27 Unlike systematic risk and 
agreement risk, indicator risk represents evidence of an adverse change in 
the target’s business rather than an actual adverse change.28  The most 
common example of indicator risk is the failure of the target to meet 
internal or external projections of financial performance.29 
C.  Legal Principles 
Delaware law governs the merger agreement in this transaction.  
Under Delaware law, no statute addresses the interpretation of MAC 
provisions in merger agreements. Therefore, Delaware courts construe 
MAC provisions using general principles of contract law.  Under basic 
contract law, the party asserting a defense for nonperformance has the 
burden of proving the facts necessary to establish that defense. 30  In 
addition, since MAC clauses are unique, Delaware courts require an 
21 Robert T. Miller, The Economics of Deal Risk: Allocating Risk Through MAC Clauses in 
Business Combination Agreements, 50 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2007, 2074–89 (2009).   
22 Miller, supra note 3, at 111. 
23 See, e.g., Transocean, Ltd., Agreement and Plan of Merger (Ex. 2.1, Form 8-K) (Aug. 
1, 2016); Atlas Resource Partners, L.P., Agreement and Plan of Merger (Ex. 2.1, Form 
8-K) (May 21, 2012).   
24 Miller, supra note 3, at 119–21.   
25 Miller, supra note 21, at 2088–90.   
26 Id.   
27 Miller, supra note 3, at 119–121.  
28 Miller, supra note 21, at 2082.   
29 Id. at 2082-2083.   
30 17 C.J.S. Contracts § 949 (2016).   
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acquiror to make a “strong showing” to excuse performance under a 
MAC provision, unless the merger agreement provides otherwise.31   
A Delaware court has never excused performance under a MAC 
provision, partly because of its default interpretation of the provision.32  
Specifically, the Court of Chancery has said a MAC provision “is best 
read as a backstop protecting the acquiror from the occurrence of 
unknown events.”33  The Court of Chancery, therefore, treats a MAC 
provision as a fail-safe to guard against unforeseeable risks.  If a buyer 
has actual knowledge of or should have known about a risk, then the 
buyer must address the risk in the language of the MAC definition.  
Otherwise, the court will assume the buyer thought the risk was 
immaterial.  For example, in IBP Shareholder Litigation, the court refused 
to excuse performance due to a drop in the target’s profitability, partly 
because the buyer knew that the target’s industry, the fresh meat 
business, was subject to dramatic swings in performance.34  
Further, the Delaware Court of Chancery defines the term 
“material” in a MAC provision as a “substantial[] threat[] [to] the overall 
earnings potential of the target in a durationally-significant manner.”35  
In other words, the target must face a serious decline in earnings over a 
long period of time, usually years rather than months, before the buyer 
can excuse performance.  In Hexion, the Court of Chancery focused on 
earnings instead of the other financial and operational results of the 
target because the acquiror focused the most on the target’s earnings in 
negotiating the transaction. 36  Nonetheless, the Court of Chancery 
reviews the other aspects of a target’s business, besides earnings, if the 
context of the transaction or the acquiror’s claim requires the Court to 
do so.37  For instance, in Frontier Oil, the Court of Chancery focused on 
the potential cost of pending tort litigation and the target’s ability to 
31 In re IBP Shareholders Litigation, 789 A.2d 14, 68 (Del. Ch. 2001) (interpreting New 
York law); Hexion Specialty Chemicals, Inc. v. Huntsman Corp., 965 A.2d 715, 738–39 
(Del. Ch. 2008) (adopting the IBP decision) (“[A]bsent clear language to the contrary, 
the burden of proof with respect to a material adverse effect rests on the party seeking 
to excuse its performance under the contract.”).     
32 Hexion, 965 A.2d at 738.    
33 IBP, 789 A.2d at 68; Hexion, 965 A.2d at 738.   
34 IBP, 789 A.2d at 71–72.   
35 Hexion, 965 A.2d at 738.   
36 See id. at 740 (noting that the parties relied on EBITA most heavily when negotiating 
and structuring the transaction).   
37 Frontier Oil, 2005 WL 1039027, at *34.   
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absorb the cost because these expenses were the pith of the acquiror’s 
decision to terminate the transaction.38  
The Delaware Court of Chancery also has provided a 
“benchmark” to use when comparing the target’s financial performance 
for different time periods in a cash merger.  Specifically, the Court 
prefers EBITDA to earnings per share.39  The Court stated that earnings 
per share is “very much a function of capital structure.”40  The Court 
reasoned that the capital structure of the target before a cash merger is 
largely irrelevant because the acquiror will replace the capital structure if 
the transaction closes.41  On the other hand, unlike earnings per share, 
EBITDA is independent of the target’s capital structure.42  Therefore, 
the Court concluded that EBITDA was the best measure of the target’s 
results of operations.43   
In Hexion, the Delaware Court of Chancery also had to address 
which fiscal periods should be compared when determining if a MAC 
has occurred.  The Court of Chancery resolved this issue by looking at 
the MAC Objects.44  The Court of Chancery reasoned that “business,” 
“financial condition,” and “results of operations” are terms of art, which 
should be interpreted in light of their meaning under Regulations S-X 
and S-K and Item 7 of Form 10-K.45  These provisions require public 
companies to disclose their financial statements for the current fiscal 
period, “along with [their] pro forma financial results for the same time 
period for each of the previous two years.”46  Thus, the proper method 
for analyzing the target’s performance is to compare each period with 
the results in the same period for a different year.47  For example, year-
end results for 2012 would be compared with year-end results for 2011, 
while first quarter results for 2012 would be compared with first quarter 
results for 2011.   
38 Id. at *35–37.    
39 Hexion, 965 A.2d at 740.   
40 Id.  
41 Id.   
42 Id.  
43 Id.   
44 Miller, supra note 3, at 150.   
45 Hexion, 965 A.2d at 742; see also 17 C.F.R. § 229.303 (2008).   
46 Hexion, 965 A.2d at 742.   
47 Id.   
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Lastly, Delaware courts are willing to focus on the specific 
language of a MAC definition.  For example, in Frontier Oil, the parties 
included any material adverse change to the “prospects” of the target 
within the definition of a MAC.48  As a result, the court engaged in a 
“forward-looking” analysis to determine if a toxic tort suit would 
negatively impact the target’s ability to earn revenue in the future. 49  
Moreover, in Hexion, the parties defined a MAC to include adverse 
changes to the target and its subsidiaries, taken as a whole.50  The phrase 
“taken as a whole” implied that the denominator for considering the 
impact of an adverse event was the target’s entire corporate family.51  As 
a result, the court refused to consider the poor performance of two 
divisions of the target in isolation from the rest of the target’s business.52    
III. DRAFTING ISSUES 
Next, the article frames four issues that the parties face in this 
transaction.  The first two issues focus on how parties can resolve 
conflicts between drafting norms and Delaware law.  On the one hand, 
legal counsel normally is reluctant to depart from drafting norms because 
standardization reduces confusion and improves the likelihood that both 
parties will understand their obligations to close under the agreement.  
On the other hand, counsel must ensure that any drafting norm 
efficiently allocates deal risk.  The third issue relates to retooling the 
main definition to include quantitative benchmarks.  Finally, the last 
issue centers on whether to include exceptions to the main definition 
given the Delaware court’s target-friendly interpretation of MAC 
definitions.       
A.  THE BURDEN OF PROOF 
In Hexion, the Delaware Court of Chancery indicated that the 
acquiror bears the burden of proof unless the merger agreement 
provides otherwise.53  This suggests the Court will allow the parties to 
alter the burden of proof in the MAC definition.  However, in the 
precedent transactions surveyed, none of the parties to the merger 
agreement chose to alter the burden of proof for invoking a MAC 
48 Frontier Oil, 2005 WL 1039027, at p. *33.    
49 Id. at p. *33–34.   
50 Hexion, 965 A.2d at 737.   
51 Id. at 745.   
52 Id.   
53 Hexion, 965 A.2d at 738–39.  
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clause.54  Therefore, the first issue is whether to alter the burden of proof 
with respect to the MAC provision.  Further, if the drafter decides to 
alter the burden of proof, he or she faces the additional issue of how the 
burden-shifting process should operate.        
B.  MATERIALITY 
The Delaware Court of Chancery has established a target-friendly 
materiality threshold, which limits the scope of an otherwise broad 
definition of what constitutes a MAC.55 Acquiring Co. could benefit by 
increasing the default materiality threshold through the MAC definition.  
However, similar to burden shifting, drafting norms do not support 
defining materiality for a MAC provision. 56 Accordingly, the second 
issue is whether the draft definition should include a materiality 
threshold.  Further, if the definition does include a standard, the drafter 
faces the additional issue of what language to employ in the standard.   
C.  BENCHMARKS OR “CARVE-INS” 
The most litigated issue in Delaware cases is whether an 
admittedly adverse change was serious enough to excuse performance.57 
To address this problem, some commentators have suggested that 
drafters should include specific “carve-ins” or thresholds in the main 
definition of a MAC.58  For example, suppose the value of Target Co.’s 
balance-sheet equity had to remain above $500 million for the merger to 
remain profitable for Acquiring Co.  Then, Acquiring Co. should insist 
on including that any change resulting in Target Co. having less than 
$500 million in balance-sheet equity is a MAC.  But Acquiring Co. and 
Target Co. have to agree on specific benchmarks ex ante, which is a 
difficult process that requires protracted negotiations. Thus, the third 
54 See, e.g., Transocean, Ltd., Agreement and Plan of Merger (Ex. 2.1, Form 8-K) (Aug. 
1, 2016); Atlas Resource Partners, L.P., Agreement and Plan of Merger (Ex. 2.1, Form 
8-K) (May 21, 2012).   
55 See Hexion, 965 A.2d at 738.   
56 See, e.g., Energy XXI (Bermuda), Ltd, Agreement and Plan of Merger (Ex. 2.1, Form 
8-K) (Mar. 13, 2014); Pioneer Natural Resources Co., Agreement and Plan of Merger 
(Ex. 2.1, Form 8-K) (Aug. 21, 2013); Union Drilling Inc., (Ex. 2.1, Form 8-K) (Sept. 28, 
2012); Basic Energy Services, Inc., Agreement and Plan of Merger (Ex. 2.1, Form 8-K) 
(Apr. 20, 2008).      
57 Miller, supra note 3, at 105.   
58 See Adam B. Chertok, Rethinking the U.S. Approach to Material Adverse Change Clauses in 
Merger Agreements, 19 U. MIAMI INT’L & COMP. L.J. 99, 109–11 (2013).  
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issue is whether the MAC definition should include specific thresholds 
or metrics or utilize a broader standard.   
D.  EXCEPTIONS OR “CARVE-OUTS” 
Acquiring Co. may argue that exceptions to the main definition 
are unnecessary to protect Target Co. because the Delaware Court of 
Chancery is unlikely to excuse performance even under a broad MAC 
provision.59  Further, Acquiring Co. cares about the value of Target Co. 
at closing, and it should not matter to Acquiring Co. if that value 
decreases because of a macroeconomic effect or mismanagement.  
Therefore, the last major issue is whether the MAC should include 
exceptions. If the drafter decides to include exceptions, he or she faces 
the additional issue of what categories of events or changes to include in 
the exceptions.   
IV. ANALYSIS 
A.  The Burden of Proof 
First, the draft definition shifts the burden of proof on to Target 
Co.60  A buyer has never met its burden of proof under Delaware law 
with respect to a MAC provision, even when the target suffers a 
considerable decline in financial performance before closing.  For 
example, in Hexion, the court found that the buyer failed to meet it 
burden, where the target suffered two years of declining EBITDA–three 
percent in 2008, then seven percent in 2009.61   However, under the draft 
definition attached as Exhibit A, Acquiring Co. has to allege 
circumstances reasonably indicating a MAC has occurred or will occur.  
Then, the burden shifts on to Target Co. to prove the absence of a MAC 
or to prove the factual basis for an exception.  In this way, the burden-
shifting process operates like a rebuttable presumption, where Acquiring 
Co. can establish a presumption by showing there is “reasonable basis” 
for concluding a MAC has occurred and Target Co. can rebut this 
presumption by showing the absence of a MAC or the applicability of an 
exception.  
Target Co. likely would resist an attempt to shift the burden of 
proof.  Target Co. may argue, for example, that shifting the burden 
would allow Acquiring Co. to declare a MAC and seek extra value from 
the transaction, even if the merger remains profitable to Acquiring Co.  
59 Stephen M. Kotran et al., supra note 7.   
60 See infra. Exhibit A, Lines 6–10.   
61 Hexion, 965 A.2d at 742.   
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In other words, Target Co. may claim that shifting the burden would 
allow Acquiring Co. to engage in rent-seeking behavior.62  Therefore, 
Acquiring Co. would have to convince Target Co., who also wants to 
maximize its own interest, to accept burden-shifting language.   
Acquiring Co. has at least three arguments in response to Target 
Co.’s worry about opportunistic behavior.  First, Acquiring Co. may 
argue that shifting the burden on to Target Co. is more efficient, which 
benefits both parties.63  Target Co. is in possession of most, if not all, of 
the information necessary to determine whether or not a MAC occurred.  
In most cases, a MAC relates to specific components or measurements 
of the target’s business operations.  The target possesses more 
information about its own business than the acquiror does.  Hence, the 
target can resolve whether an adverse change materially affected its 
business at a cheaper cost than the acquiror can.  In this sense, Target 
Co. is the least-cost avoider when it comes to producing enough 
evidence to determine whether a MAC occurred.64  As a result, Target 
Co. should bear the burden of proof because it may do so more 
efficiently.   
Second, Acquiring Co. arguably is not incentivized to use the 
threat of a MAC declaration to extract value out of Target Co. arbitrarily.  
Acquiring Co. believes the merger with Target Co. will maximize value 
for its business.  Otherwise, Acquiring Co. would not agree to the 
merger.  But declaring a MAC arbitrarily will harm Target Co.’s public 
reputation, because the declaration will involve releasing negative insider 
information about Target Co.’s business in a public forum.65  Assuming 
the markets do not have this information, they may react more harshly to 
this announcement than Acquiring Co. expects.  For example, key 
customers may stop purchasing oil from Target Co. in favor of a 
competitor, or Target Co.’s investors may decide to sell off their shares 
in the market, thereby decreasing the market capitalization of XYZ Co.’s 
equity.  Any decline in the market price for Target Co.’s equity may 
outweigh any gain Acquiring Co. receives from rent seeking.  This may 
not always be the case, but this argument at least shows that Acquiring 
62 I use the term “rent-seeking” to mean any activity that serves no other purpose 
except to wrongfully transfer value from one party to another.  See Mark Seidenfeld & 
Murat C. Mungan, Duress as Rent-Seeking, 99 MINN. L. REV. 1423, 1426–27 n.18 (2015) 
(explaining the origin and general use of the term “rent-seeking” in the context of law 
and economics).      
63 See Chertok, supra note 56, at 120.   
64 Id.   
65 See Miller, supra note 21, at 2074–75.    
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Co. has some interest in preserving the value of Target Co., which 
should minimize Acquiring Co.’s tendency to harm Target Co.’s 
interests.   
Third, Acquiring Co. could damage its own reputation if it 
declares a MAC without supporting evidence. Other market participants 
may question the integrity of Acquiring Co.’s management if Acquiring 
Co. is willing to assert a questionable MAC claim to engage in rent-
seeking behavior.  As a result, market participants may refuse to engage 
in valuable transactions with Acquiring Co. in the future.  Therefore, 
Acquiring Co. could harm its own long-term prospects by declaring a 
MAC without any credible evidence.    
B.  Materiality 
Next, the draft definition, attached as Exhibit A, defines 
“materiality” to circumvent IBP and Hexion’s pro-target construction of 
that term.  The draft MAC definition borrows from the concept of 
materiality under the Securities Act of 1933, as amended, and the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended.66  Although the Delaware 
Court of Chancery views MAC provisions as unique, the purpose of 
materiality in the federal securities laws parallels the goal of the term 
“material” in a MAC clause.  For example, in the antifraud provisions of 
securities laws, materiality serves the purpose of filtering out information 
that is not substantially likely to affect the decision of a reasonable 
investor to purchase or sell a security.  Similarly, the term “material” in a 
MAC definition serves the purpose of filtering out changes that would 
not justify a reasonable acquiror’s decision to terminate the merger 
agreement and walk away from the transaction.67  In other words, both 
concepts of materiality attempt to sort important facts from unimportant 
facts.   
Specifically, the draft definition conditions materiality on the 
probability that an adverse change would affect a reasonable acquiror’s 
decision to complete the transaction as contemplated by the merger 
agreement between Target Co. and Acquiring Co.  Under the draft 
definition, if a change in Target Co. has a reasonable likelihood of 
affecting a reasonable acquiror’s decision to close the transaction, then 
the change is considered material.  The draft definition uses “reasonable 
66 See Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 244 (1988) (applying the TSC Industries tests in 
the context of a securities fraud claim under § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 
1934, as amended); TSC Industries, Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438 (1976) 
(creating the “importance” and “total mix” tests in the context of proxy litigation).   
67 IBP, 789 A.2d at 68; Hexion, 965 A.2d at 738.   
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likelihood,” as opposed to “substantial likelihood” like the TSC Industries 
test, because the former is more consistent with drafting norms in MAC 
definitions.68  Further, the draft definition uses an objective “reasonable 
acquiror” standard instead of a subjective standard because a subjective 
standard would increase the opportunity for rent-seeking behavior by 
allowing the acquiror to invoke a MAC based on its own perceptions, 
however unreasonable.69  The draft definition focuses on the reasonable 
acquiror’s decision to complete this transaction, because Acquiring Co. 
and Target Co. plan to use the MAC provision to shift risk between 
signing and closing.  In this context, therefore, an adverse change is 
important if it would likely alter the reasonable acquiror’s decision to 
close.   
One potential problem with the draft definition’s conception of 
materiality is that “reasonable acquiror” is a vague term.70  Further, a 
court would unlikely analogize the term to the “reasonable investor” in 
securities law because an acquiror of an entire business has different 
considerations and merits different protections than an investor 
purchasing securities in a public market.  However, the problem of 
vagueness is minimized in the draft definition, because the draft 
definition provides a lens through which a court can understand the 
reasonable acquiror.  In particular, the definition’s language links the 
reasonable acquiror’s decision of whether or not to close the transaction 
contemplated by Acquiring Co. and Target Co.  In this way, the 
definition incorporates subjective elements to illuminate what the 
reasonable acquiror should consider significant based on Acquiring Co. 
and Target Co.’s reasons for entering the transaction.71  For example, if 
Acquiring Co. planned to acquire Target Co. to make long-term use of 
its assets, then a short-term drop in Target Co.’s earnings is not 
reasonably likely to affect the reasonable acquiror’s decision to complete 
the merger.   
Moreover, the draft MAC definition applies to the “Target and 
its Subsidiaries, taken as a whole.”  This language sets the denominator 
in the analysis of what constitutes a material adverse change, such that an 
event must be measured against Target Co.’s whole business rather than 
68 Miller, supra note 3, at 114.   
69  See Adams, supra note 5, at 25 (reasoning that MAC provisions would be 
“unworkable” if acquirors could declare a MAC based on subjective perceptions).   
70 Adams, supra note 5, at 24.   
71 See Yair Y. Galil, MAC Clauses in a Materially Adversely Changed Economy, 2002 COLUM. 
BUS. L. REV. 846, 850 (2002) (discussing why materiality ought to depend on the “needs 
and purposes of the [acquiror]”).   
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a single subsidiary.  In Hexion, the Court refused to look at two 
unprofitable divisions of Huntsman Corp. because the agreement set the 
denominator at the target’s entire business. 72   Thus, a drafter may 
consider decreasing the denominator in the MAC analysis by including 
different language, like the “Target or any of its Subsidiaries, taken 
individually.”  However, viewing a MAC through the lens of Target Co.’s 
entire business is justified in this transaction. Target Co. only has three 
subsidiaries and each subsidiary accounts for 20% of Target Co.’s 
revenue.  Further, one subsidiary, Volunteer, accounted for a quarter of 
Target Co.’s revenue from 2012 to 2014.  Thus, if a subsidiary loses a 
significant amount of value, the effect or change will translate to Target 
Co.’s entire business. Based on the facts, none of the subsidiaries are 
valuable to Target Co.’s operations on an individual basis, apart from the 
revenue they offer.  As a result, a change in the operations of a subsidiary 
should not trigger Acquiring Co.’s right to terminate the transaction 
under the MAC provisions unless that change also significantly affects 
Target Co.’s entire business.   
C.  Benchmarks or “Carve-Ins” 
Most MAC definitions are drafted to include qualifying words in 
the applicable standards.  For example, MAC definitions may provide for 
effects based on what “reasonably could be expected to have a material 
adverse effect,” rather than on specific benchmarks. 73   Yet, some 
practitioners have predicted that drafters will begin to favor ‘“greater 
precision and specificity”’ in MAC clauses and will “‘attempt to quantify 
a MAC by specifying changes in agreed-upon metrics.”’74 For example, 
assume Acquiring Co. cared most about Target Co.’s distribution 
contracts as a potential source of revenue.  Then, Acquiring Co. could 
insist on the following language in the main definition:  “A Material 
Adverse Change occurs when the Target and its Subsidiaries, taken as a 
whole, lose up to 25% of the revenue earned from the distribution 
contracts listed on Schedule [A].”   
Although benchmarks make sense in some transactions, drafters 
have not incorporated them in most public company transactions.75  In 
this transaction, the parties should avoid including specific benchmarks 
72 Id. at 745.   
73 See Pioneer Natural Resources Co., Agreement and Plan of Merger (Ex. 2.1, Form 8-
K) (Aug. 21, 2013).   
74  Chertok, supra note 56, at 110 (quoting Peter S. Golden et al., Negotiated Cash 
Acquisitions of Public Companies in Uncertain Times, M&A LAWYER, Feb. 2009, at 6).   
75 Id. at 111. 
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in the main definition for three reasons.  First, reaching the appropriate 
metric would cost the parties more in drafting and negotiating costs than 
simply using a standard.76  In the above example, Target Co. may dispute 
the 25% benchmark or believe different contracts should be included on 
the list.  Resolving this dispute could require protracted negotiation, 
thereby decreasing the net value of the merger to both parties.  Second, 
the drafter must set the metric before signing, which means the drafter 
will base the benchmark on data that may change at a future date. 77  
Although a standard also must be established ex ante, a drafter may create 
one flexible enough to apply to changing circumstances should the need 
arise.  Third, a broad standard may work to the advantage of Acquiring 
Co. because Acquiring Co. may use its flexibility to renegotiate favorable 
price terms.  In fact, several acquirors have used this tactic in recent 
transactions.  For example, Pro Acquisition Corp. used a broadly drafted 
MAC definition to bargain for a 17.6% price discount in a $10 billion 
transaction with Home Depot.78    
D.  Exceptions or “Carve-Outs” 
The draft definition does include exceptions or “carve-outs.”  In 
particular, the definition excludes five types of systematic risk,79 one type 
of agreement risk,80 and one type of indicator risk.81  The overall effect 
of an exception is to allocate the risk of an adverse event on to Acquiring 
Co., who will only assume this risk for good reason.  Therefore, this part 
analyzes why Acquiring Co. should accept the allocation of risk in the 
exceptions to the MAC definition. 
Neither Acquiring Co. nor Target Co. can do much to prevent 
systematic risk from materializing. Both parties also have an incentive to 
minimize the impacts of systematic risk.  Acquiring Co. obviously wants 
to preserve the value of Target Co.’s assets because it plans to own those 
assets soon.  Target Co. has an incentive to minimize the impact of 
systematic risk because the merger agreement likely will contain an 
ordinary course covenant requiring Target Co. to preserve its ordinary 
operations.82  Thus, Acquiring Co. gains little by insisting that Target Co. 
76 See id. at 136.   
77 See id.   
78 Id. at 127–128.    
79 See infra. Exhibit A, Lines 11–18.   
80 See infra. Exhibit A, Lines 18–19.    
81 See infra. Exhibit A, Lines 19–22.  
82 Miller, supra note 21, at 2074.   
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should assume the risk of adverse systematic changes.  By contrast, 
Target Co. may face serious reputational damage from Acquiring Co. 
declaring a MAC based upon the occurrence of a systematic adverse 
change.  This reputational damage will place Target Co. at a competitive 
disadvantage if the merger fails, or result in a downward adjustment to 
the purchase price.83 As a result, Acquiring Co. should assume certain 
systematic risks because Target Co. has much more to lose by doing so 
than Acquiring Co.  The five types I selected—changes in the law, 
changes in accounting regulations, industry-wide changes, political or 
economic shifts, and natural disasters —are the most common among 
merger agreements in the energy sector based upon my research. 84   
Therefore, they may serve as a starting place for negotiations in this 
transaction.  
 Similar to systematic risk, Acquiring Co. has little to gain by 
shifting certain agreement risks on to Target Co.  The typical ordinary 
course covenant requires a target to take reasonable steps to preserve its 
goodwill and relationships with customers, creditors, and the like. 85   
Further, disruptions related to the announcement of the merger are 
unlikely to result in a MAC if the target makes even a minimal effort to 
comply with its covenants.86  Another reason to shift agreement risk on 
to Acquiring Co. is to prevent Acquiring Co. from engaging in rent-
seeking behavior. 87   Although Acquiring Co. is not incentivized to 
arbitrarily declare a MAC, Target Co. nonetheless may argue it is easier 
for Acquiring Co. to behave opportunistically because Acquiring Co. 
does not bear the burden of proof.   
Lastly, the draft definition shifts only one type of indicator risk 
on to Acquiring Co. Specifically, Acquiring Co. cannot declare a MAC 
based upon Target Co.’s inability to meet internal or external projections. 
Target Co. obviously is in the best position to ensure that its own 
business meets projections.  Thus, Target Co. may avoid this risk at a 
cheaper cost than Acquiring Co., which explains why many acquirors do 
83 See id. at 2076–77.   
84 Transocean, Ltd., Agreement and Plan of Merger (Ex. 2.1, Form 8-K) (Aug. 1, 2016); 
Energy XXI (Bermuda), Ltd, Agreement and Plan of Merger (Ex. 2.1, Form 8-K) (Mar. 
13, 2014); Pioneer Natural Resources Co., Agreement and Plan of Merger (Ex. 2.1, 
Form 8-K) (Aug. 21, 2013); Union Drilling Inc., (Ex. 2.1, Form 8-K) (Sept. 28, 2012); 
Basic Energy Services, Inc., Agreement and Plan of Merger (Ex. 2.1, Form 8-K) (Apr. 
20, 2008).      
85 See Miller, supra note 21, at 2088.   
86 Id.   
87 Id.   
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not assume indicator risk. 88   But projections often are based upon 
incomplete information and, if they are internal, may be aspirational.89  
In other words, projections are speculative by nature and may be wrong.  
Further, indicator risk only provides evidence of a MAC, unlike 
agreement or systematic risk, which directly harm the target’s operations 
when they materialize.90  
V. MINOR DRAFTING ISSUES 
The following issues may require a drafter’s further attention:   
• Whether the merger agreement will include arbitration or 
some type of alternative dispute resolution provision that 
would cover disputes and interpretation issues relating to 
MAC clauses.  I assumed that the Court of Chancery would 
interpret MAC the provision if a dispute arises in this 
transaction.  However, a drafter should consider whether 
alternative dispute resolution offers significant benefits to the 
parties in the transaction.    
• Whether a drafter may achieve the goal of a MAC with 
special termination rights.  Termination rights may be more 
effective if the target is unwilling to accept the burden-
shifting language or definition of materiality proposed in my 
draft definition.   
• The draft definition does not include material adverse 
changes to Target Co. and its subsidiaries’ “prospects.” A 
target rarely is willing to include prospects because it would 
give an acquiror an exit over a change in performance at 
some expected point in the future.91  However, the acquiror 
has a good reason to insist upon changing the drafting 
norms.  Some commentators have suggested Delaware courts 
read “prospects” into any MAC definition. 92   These 
88 See id. at 2084.   
89 See id. at 2083.   
90 See id. at 2072.   
91 See Miller, supra note 3, at 116 (finding that prospects were only included in 17% of 
cash mergers after surveying 353 merger agreements).  
92 Miller, supra note 3, at 117.   
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commentators base this conclusion on the Court of 
Chancery’s “materiality threshold,” which purports to rely on 
the target’s future earnings to determine if a MAC has 
occurred.93    
• I included disproportionality exceptions to the exceptions for 
systematic risk.  A disproportionality exception does not 
allow the target to rely on an exception for systematic risk if 
the underlying event, like a natural disaster, had a 
disproportional impact on the target. In other words, 
disproportionality exceptions essentially shift the risk of a 
disproportional impact back to the target.  This makes sense 
because the target is in the best position to minimize the 
impact of a systematic risk on its own business.    
V. CONCLUSION 
A MAC provision allows an acquiror to terminate, or more 
frequently renegotiate, a merger transaction after adverse conditions 
impact the target between signing and closing. This article proposes a 
draft definition that attempts to resolve common problems drafters face 
when defining the MAC term in a cash merger.  Specifically, this article 
suggests: (1) shifting the burden of proof to the target; (2) defining 
materiality in light of federal securities law; (3) relying on a flexible 
standard rather than specific benchmarks; and (4) excluding certain types 
of risk when it is efficient to do so.  Hopefully, these solutions can help 
drafters create a more meaningful MAC provision in transactions 
governed by Delaware law.   
  
93 Id.   
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EXHIBIT A 
“Material Adverse Change” means any adverse change: (i) in the 
business, assets, condition (financial or otherwise), or results of 
operations of the Target and its Subsidiaries, taken as a whole, that is 
reasonably likely to affect a reasonable acquiror’s decision to complete 
the Merger contemplated by this Agreement; (ii) that materially limits the 
ability of the Target to perform its obligations under this Agreement; or 
(iii) that materially limits the ability of the Target to complete the merger 
or any other transaction contemplated by this Agreement. If the 
Acquiror alleges facts or circumstances reasonably indicating that a 
Material Adverse Change either has occurred or will occur, then the 
Target has the burden of proving the absence of a Material Adverse 
Change or the applicability of any of the exceptions set forth below in 
clauses (a) through (g). 
 Notwithstanding the foregoing, Material Adverse Change shall 
not include: (a) changes in United States’ GAAP or the regulatory 
accounting requirements applicable to any industry in which the Target 
or any of its Subsidiaries operates; (b) changes in the financial, securities, 
or credit markets of the United States; (c) changes in the general 
economic or political conditions of the United States or the occurrence 
of a storm, earthquake, drought, or other natural disaster; (d) changes 
affecting the oil industry as a whole, including (without limitation) 
changes in the cost of supplies, transportation, the price of 
hydrocarbons, or other operating costs; (e) changes in Applicable Law, 
or the interpretation of Applicable Law; (f) changes resulting from the 
announcement of this Agreement or any actions taken under this 
Agreement; and (g) the failure of the Target or any of its Subsidiaries, 
taken individually, to meet any internal or external budgets, projections, 
forecasts or predictions of financial performance for any period, but not 
any fact, change, event, occurrence or effect underlying or contributing 
to such failure.  Nevertheless, any change resulting from the events, 
circumstances, or effects described in clauses (b), (c), (d), and (e) will 
result in a Material Adverse Change if the event, circumstance, or effect 
has a disproportionate impact on the Target and its Subsidiaries, taken as 
a whole, relative to other participants in the Target’s industry 
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GLOSSARY  
 
“Acquiror” means ABC Energy Company, a Delaware corporation.   
 “Agreement” means the agreement that was signed and dated on October 
26, 2016, providing for the Merger.   
 “Applicable Law” means any rule, regulation, code, governmental 
determination, order, treaty, convention, governmental certification 
requirement or other public limitation, U.S. or non-U.S.  
 “GAAP” means Generally Accepted Accounting Principles in effect in 
the United States as of October 26, 2016.  
 “Merger” means the merger of the Target with and into the Acquiror 
under the Agreement.   
 “Subsidiary” or “Subsidiaries” means Volunteer Resources, Inc., Capital 
Shipping, Inc., or Huxley Distribution, Inc.  
 “Target” means XYZ Drilling Company, a Delaware corporation.  
